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AN ORIGINALISM FOR NONORIGINALISTS
Randy E. Barnett*

I. INTRODUCTION: 0RIGINALISM IS DEAD; LONG LIVE
0RIGINALISM

The received wisdom among law professors is that
originalism is dead, having been defeated in intellectual combat
sometime in the eighties. According to this story, Edwin Meese 1
and Robert Bork 2 proposed that the Constitution be interpreted

* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law. Email: <rbarnett
@bu.edu>. This Article was prepared as the basis ofthe Brendan Brown Lecture that was given
at the Loyola University New Orleans School of Law in Apri11999. In October 1999, it was
also given as part of the distinguished lecturer series at the St. Thomas University School of Law.
h is part of a larger work in progress entitled THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY. I profited greatly
from the written suggestions of Bob Bone, Gary Lawson, Gerry Leonard, David Lyons, Richard
McAdams, Glenn Reynolds, and the students in my seminar on constitutional interpretation. I
also wish to thank participants in the law faculty workshops at Boston University and the University of Florida for their most helpful comments.
1. See Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Address before the American Bar Association
(July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 9 ( 1986);
see also Edwin Meese, A Return to Constitutional Interpretation from Judicial Law-Making,
40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 925, 925-33 (1996).
2. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, IND. L.J.,
Fall1971, at I.
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according to the original intentions of its framers. Their view
was trounced by many academic critics, perhaps most notably
by Paul Brest in his widely-cited 1980 Boston University Law
Review article, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding,3 and by H. Jefferson Powell in his 1985 Harvard Law
Review article, The Original UnderstandingofOriginal Intent. 4
Taken together, these and other articles represent a
two-pronged attack on originalism that was perceived at
the time as devastating. As a method of constitutional
interpretation, originalism was both unworkable and itself
contrary to the original intentions of the founders. 5 These
criticisms are so familiar and widely accepted that I need
only list them here.
According to Brest, originalism was unworkable because
it was practically impossible to ascertain and then aggregate
the "intention votes" of a multitude of framers, much less to
carry them forward to apply to a current controversy. 6
The act of translation required . . . involves the
counterfactual and imaginary act of projecting the
adopters' concepts and attitudes into a future they
probably could not have envisioned. When the interpreter
engages in this sort of projection, she is in a fantasy world
more of her own than of the adopters' making. 7
Powell, in turn, decisively showed that, to quote from the
abstract preceding the article, "the modern resort to the 'intent
of the framers' can gain no support from the assertion that such
was the framer's expectation, for the framers themselves did

3. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204
( 1980). As of March 6, 2000, this article had been cited in 544 articles. (Westlaw search in
Journals and Law Reviews database: [brest /s "misconceived quest"]).
4. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding ofOriginal Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv.
885 ( 1985). As of March 6, 2000, this article had been cited 3 76 times. (Westlaw search in
Journals and Law Reviews database: [powell Is "original understanding of original intent"]).
5. A useful collection of articles representing the arguments made on both sides of this
issue in the seventies and eighties is INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
6. See Brest, supra note 3, at 212-22.
7. /d. at 221.
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not believe such an interpretive strategy to be appropriate." 8
This seemingly reduced originalists to a contradictory position:
We should violate the original intentions of the framers by
relying on their original intent.
Even those who get beyond the Brest and Powell criticisms
still encounter two additional and seemingly insurmountable
obstacles to originalism. If constitutions are based on popular
sovereignty or consent, the framers and ratifiers of the U.S.
Constitution represented only white males, not the People, and
therefore could not legitimately bind those who were not parties.
And even were the Constitution somehow binding when adopted,
it was adopted by long-dead men who cannot rule us from the
grave.
Moreover, a generation that countenanced slave-holders
has not the moral legitimacy to rule us from the grave or from
anywhere else. Because their intentions were racist, sexist,
and classist, far from being bound by them, we ought loudly
to denounce and reject them. According to this view, not only
was the Constitution not a product of the consent, it was a
product of original sin.
If ever a theory had a stake driven through its heart; it
seems to be originalism. My purpose at this juncture is not to
rehearse in detail the arguments against originalism or the
responses of originalists to them. My purpose is merely to
restate the consensus about how the debate came out as a prelude to making what for many will be a startling claim:
Originalism has not only survived the debate of the eighties,
but it has virtually triumphed over its rivals. Originalism is
now the prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation.
Even more remarkably, it has prevailed without anyone writing
a definitive formulation oforiginalism or a definitive refutation
of its critics. 9

8. Powell, supra note 4, at 885.
9. Richard Kay is one defender of originalism, however, who deserves special mention for
the thoughtfulness and cogency of his analysis. See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original
Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv.
226, 244 ( 1988). Kay defends an original intention version of original ism based on popular
sovereignty which is not the version that I shall be presenting in this Article. Nevertheless, I will
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This is a difficult claim to prove and, in the end, it is peripheral to my principal objective, which is to identify both a version
and justification of originalism that would be satisfactory to
many who consider themselves, as I did, 10 nonoriginalists. So
I will only offer a few items of evidence on its behalf, and these
will also assist me in identifying the new, more acceptable
originalism.
Exhibit A is the tenor of the popular debate over the meaning of disputed terms of the Constitution. Take, for example,
the impeachment of President Clinton. When the issue of which
offenses constituted impeachable "high crimes and misdemeanors" was raised, originalist evidence was commonly offered by
the President's academic defenders. In particular, oft-cited
was Alexander Hamilton's discussion in Federalist 65 11 where
he wrote:
The subjects of [a well-constituted court for the trial of
impeachments] are those offenses which proceed from the
misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the
abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated
political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immed-

rely on some of Kay's arguments below. Since this Article was first drafted, Keith Whittington
has published the most comprehensive and philosophically sophisticated defense of originalism
to date. See KEITH E. WHIITINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, & JUDICIAL REVIEW ( 1999). Whittington bases his justification of originalism
on a version of popular sovereignty he calls "potential sovereignty." See id. at 135-52. Though
I do not find this justification ultimately persuasive, I shall use some of his other arguments
concerning originalism below.
I0. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the
Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1210 (1996) ("Indeed, one of the authors of this
article, Don Kates, takes an originalist approach to interpretation, while the other, Randy Barnett,
does not."); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance ofthe Framers' Intent, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL 'y 403, passim ( 1996) (distinguishing between interpretation based on a conception of
the Framers as wardens and one that is based on a conception of the Framers as designers.).
11. See, e.g., Aaron Epstein, Founding Fathers Dictated Outcome of Clinton Trial, THE
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sunday, February 14, 1999, at A15 ("If there are any laurels to be awarded,
they must go to the likes of James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and George Mason. It was
those men and their colleagues who wrote into the Constitution the central idea that virtually
dictated the outcome of the 1999 impeachment trial of William Jefferson Clinton, and left the
president intact but tainted, the nation shaken but stable.").
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iately to the society itself. 12
While other forms of arguments were also used, originalist claims
received a prominent place in the public and private statements of
many law professors.
In a like manner, the arguments normally offered against
interpreting the Second Amendment as protecting an individual
right are almost exclusively originalist -though a highly implausible version of that intent-that the Second Amendment originally was intended to protect, not an individual right, but the
organized militias that have since been superceded by the state
National Guard. This form of argument extends beyond the
scholarly literature. When I lecture on the Second Amendment,
nearly all the arguments I hear from the very constitutional
law professors who supposedly have rejected originalism are
based on original intent. Putting aside the possibility that
such arguments are exercises in cynicism, why analyze the
meaning of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" 13 or "the right .
. . to keep and bear Arms" 14 in this manner unless some version
of originalism matters?
Exhibit B is the tenor of current academic discussion of
methods of constitutional interpretation. It was telling when
Tom Grey, who in 1975 originated the much-used distinction
between "interpretivist" and '1noninterpretivist" methods, 15
rejected it in 1988 in favor of the distinction between "textualist"
and "supplementer." 16 "As I would frame the debate now," he

12. THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 4.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
IS. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703,
705-.()7 ( 1975).
Where the broader view ofjudicial review diverges from the pure interpretive model is in its acceptance of the courts' additional role as the expounder ofbasic national ideals ofindividualliberty and
fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive law in
the written Constitution.
/d. at 220.
16. See Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
211' 220-21 (1988).
I now think that "nonintepretivism," besides being stylistically barbarous, is a misleading term for
the view that accepts the legitimacy ofjudicial enforcement of an unwritten constitution. It is better
to treat all approaches to constitutional adjudication as constrained to the interpretation of the
sources of constitutional law, and then to argue about what those sources are and how much relative
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wrote,
some interpreters, textualists (Judge Bork and his allies
for example), treat the constitutional text as the sole
legitimate source of operative norms of constitutional law.
Other interpreters, supplementers (my crowd, the good
guys), treat the text as the overriding source where it
speaks clearly, but supplemented by an unwritten
constitution made up of principles that underlie precedent
and practice as seen from the perspective of the present.
The text itself authorizes resort to these unwritten sources
through provisions like the ninth amendment and the due
process clausesP
Conceding that "the text [is] the overriding source where it speaks
clearly'' was significant, arguing that "[t]he text itself authorizes
resort to . . . unwritten sources" underscored the concession to
originalism being made. 18
A similar shift occurred in Ronald Dworkin's thinking between Taking Rights Seriously which had emphasized the relationship between background and institutional rights 19 and Law's
Empire which emphasized "law as integrity" in which interpretation based on both fit and justification dominates. 20 The "fit"
part ofhis approach seemingly requires that the text and historical understandings of the text figure into constitutional interpretation in a nontrivial manner. Most recently Dworkin has presented a very sympathetic and plausible version of originalism-a
version he calls "semantic originalism" 21 to which I will return-though he still does not endorse it himself. 22

weight they should have.
Grey, supra, at 220.
17. Grey, supra note 16, at 221.
18. !d.
19. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (4th prtg., 1977).
20. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE ( 1986).
21. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MA TIER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTSANDTHELAW 115, 119-27 (Amy Gutman, ed., 1997).
22. See Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and
Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1258 n.18 ( 1997) ("I did not mean, in my brief remarks, to
abandon ... my long-standing opposition to any form of originalism ....").
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To these examples could be added others. 23 As Jack Rakove
observed after listing those constitutional scholars who have
offered originalist arguments, "[b]ut in truth, the turn to
originalism seems so general that citation is almost beside the
point." 24 Though it is possible to characterize this intellectual
movement as a shift, not to originalism, but to textualism, I
think this distinction is hard to maintain. Once the importance
of text or "writtenness" is conceded, some version of originalism
becomes much harder to resist. For, as I will try to show, the
reasons why text is important are also the same reasons that
support some modest version of originalism, as well as a justification for originalism that should be acceptable even to many
nonoriginalists. These reasons also place a kind of burden of
persuasion upon anyone proposing to replace reliance on the
text by some other method of interpretation.
And this also helps explain why the shift to originalism
has occurred, if indeed it has. 25 It takes a theory to beat a theory
and, after a decade oftrying, the opponents oforiginalism have
never congealed around an appealing and practical alternative.
The inability of the most brilliant and creative legal minds to
present a plausible method of interpretation that engendered
enough confidence to warrant overriding the text helped make
some version of originalism much more attractive.
Notwithstanding what I am calling the power of text or
"writtenness," this shift might still never have occurred if it
threatened the political commitments of the dominant academic
establishment. In this regard, the shift to originalism was made
much easier, and perhaps even possible, by law professors' discovery of the neorepublican historical scholarship on the founding

23. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13-14 (1991) (counting
both "historical" and "textual" as useful and legitimate "modalities" of constitutional argument).
24. Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to it), 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1587, 1592
n.14 ( 1997) (listing Bruce Ackerman, Akhil A mar, Chris Eisgruber, Daniel Farber, Martin
Flaherty, Michael Klarman, Michael McConnell, Mark Killenbeck, Larry Kramer, Henry
Monaghan, and William Treanor).
25. For another scholar who hfiS noticed the shift to "broad originalism" by political progressives, see James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1335
( 1997). "In recent years, the originalist premise has also been manifested in the emerging strain
of broad originalism in liberal and progressive constitutional theory." /d. at 1344.
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era, such as that by Gordon Wood. 26 Ifthe founders were really
proto-socialists or communitarians, then originalism seemed
much less threatening. 27 Another discovery that eased the minds
of progressive law professors, as reflected in the passages by
Tom Grey already quoted, was the rediscovery of the Ninth
Amendment 28 and Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 If the Constitution's text explicitly authorized "supplementation" by moral principles, and originalism
did not foreclose such appeals, then originalism was not so bad
after all.
Also contributing to the comfort level of political progressives was the influential work of Bruce Ackerman in the eighties
and nineties, culminating in We the People: Foundations 30 in
1991 and then with We the People: Transformations 31 in 1998.
In these works, Ackerman presents a plausible, though in my
view ultimately unpersuasive, originalist defense of contemporary progressive political values. His theory of"dualism" distinguishes the "higher-law" made deliberately by the people from
"normal lawmaking" by government, the servants of the people,
who "re-present" but do not speak for the people. 32 The critical
job of judges interpreting the Constitution is the
backward-looking responsibility of preserving the "higher-law"
established by the people during rare constitutional moments. 33
"It is not the special province of the judges to lead the People
onward and upward to new and higher values," he wrote. "What
the judges are especially equipped to do is preserve the achieve-

26. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787
( 1969); William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding ofthe Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 819-25 ( 1995) (applying Wood's neorepublican historical
account to the takings clause).
27. Cf Fleming, supra note 25, at 1345 ("The broad originalists undertook the 'turn to
history' to show that their constitutional theories, aspirations, and ideals are firmly rooted in our
constitutional history .and practice, and indeed provide a better account of our constitutional text
and tradition than do those 'of the conservative narrow originalists. ").
28. See generally Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
37(1988).
29. See, e.g., MICHAELKENTCURTIS,NOSTATESHALLABRIDGE:THEFOURTEENTHAMENDMENT ANI? THE BILL OF RIGHTS ( 1986).
30. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS ( 1991 ).
31. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS ( 1998).
32. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 139.
33. /d.
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ments of popular sovereignty during the long periods of our public
existence when the citizenry is not mobilized for great constitutional achievements." 34 Respecting popular sovereignty means
respecting judgments made by the People in the past. "[T]his
ongoing judicial effort to look backward and interpret the meaning of the great achievements of the past is an indispensable
part of the larger project of distinguishing the will of We the
People from the acts of We the Politicians." 35
Origin a lists never denied the possibility of a constitutional
amendment that would itself, in turn, be interpreted according
to its original intent. Therefore, so long as it could be argued
that the Constitution has been legitimately amended, a commitment to originalism is no insurmountable barrier to a progressive
political agenda. If Ackerman could show that the New Deal
comprised a "constitutional moment" that effectively amended
the Constitution, 36 then modern conservatives and libertarians,
both on and off the court, would be acting improperly to disregard
the original intent of the New Deal judicial amendments. In
this way, Ackerman's approach-though criticized in its particulars37-helped make originalism safe for the politically progressive academic world. For, ifhis theory of constitutional moments
was correct, one could be a genuinely originalist defender of
the Welfare State against conservative or libertarian constitutional attack. And Ackerman's feat has been reinforced by the
originalist writings of his protege and colleague Akhil Amar. 38
·Other political progressives who appear to have taken the
originalist turn, or have at least incorporated a fully-functioning

34.' See I ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 139.
.
35. I ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at I 0 (emphasis added); see also 2 ACKERMAN, supra note
31, at 72 (seeking a method that does "justice to the complexities of the original understand-

ing.").
36. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 345-49.
37. See, e.g., Elizabeth Price, Constitutional Fidelity and the Commerce Clause: A Reply
to Professor Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE L. REv. 139 (1998). But even if Ackerman is wrong to
contend that the "switch in time" of 193 7 represents an unwritten amendment to the Constitution
meriting the same judicial respect as formally adopted written amendments, this would not
undercut his "dualist" defense of interpreting the original Constitution as it has been formally
amended from a historical or preservationist perspective.
·
38. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998).
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originalism into their approaches, include Michael Perry, 39
MartinS. Flaherty, 40 Lawrence Lessig, 41 and William Treanor. 42
II. THE NEW 0RIGINALISM

Perhaps most important of all, however, originalism has
itself changed-from original intention to original meaning.
No longer do originalists claim to be seeking the subjective
intentions ofthe frame.rs. Now both Robert Bork and Antonin
Scalia, no less than Ronald Dworkin and Bruce Ackerman, seek
the original meaning of the text. As stated by Robert Bork:
Though I have written of the understanding of the
ratifiers of the Constitution, since they enacted it and
made it law, that is actually a shorthand formulation,
because what the ratifiers understood themselves to be
enacting must be taken to be what the public of that time
would have understood the words to mean. It is important
to be clear about this. The search is not for a subjective
intention. If someone found a letter from George
Washington to Martha telling her that what he meant by
the power to lay taxes was not what other people meant,
that would not change our reading of the Constitution in
the slightest. Nor would the subjective intentions of all
the members of a ratifying convention alter anything.
When lawmakers use words, the law that results is what
those words ordinarily mean. 43
By the same token Justice Scalia has written that "[w]e
look for a sort of'objectified' intent-the intent that a reasonable
person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside

39. See MICHAEL 1. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? ( 1994).
40. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995).
41. While Lessig's "translation" approach is not original ism per se, its starting point is
originalist and this concedes, if nothing else, that originalism is possible. See, e.g., Lawrence
Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1365 (1997). For a criticism of the what
comes after the starting point, see Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment on Professor Lessig's Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435
(1997).
42. See Treanor, supra note 26, at 782-83 (using a "translation" approach to the Takings
Clause, the first step of which is originalist).
43. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 ( 1990).
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the remainder of the corpus juris . ... Government by unexpressed intent is ... tyrannical. It is the law that governs, not
the intent of the lawgiver." 44
Though I will be arguing below that the Constitution should
not be viewed as a contract, the shift from original intention
to original meaning is akin to the shift from a will theory to
a consent theory of contract. It is a subtle shift to be sure since,
in contract law, both approaches seek to respect and protect
the "intentions of the parties" in some sense. However, whereas
a will theory of contract invites an inquiry into the subjective
mental state of the promisor, a consent theory seeks the objective
meaning that would be understood by a reasonable person in
the relevant community of discourse. 45 In constitutional in terpretation, the shift is from the original intentions or will of the
lawmakers, to the objective original meaning that a reasonable
listener would place on the words used in the constitutional
provision at the time of its enactment.
This shift obviates some, but not all, of the most telling
practical objections to originalism and can be very disappointing
for critics of originalism-and especially for historians-when
they read original meaning analysis. They expect to see a richly
detailed legislative history only to find references to dictionaries,
common contemporary meanings, and logical inferences from
the structure and general purposes of the text. That is the way
the objective approach to contract interpretation proceeds, and
that is how the new originalism based on original meaning proceeds as well. Nowadays it is often critics of those advocating
a particular original "objective" meaning who offer detailed
historical examination of the true "subjective" original intentions
of the framers.

44. SCALIA, supra note 21, at 17.
45. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory ofContract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 272-74,
300-09 (1986); see also Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV. I 022, I 027 ( 1992) (further distinguishing a consent from a will theory of contract).
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But original meaning originalism is even more mundane
or "wooden" 46 than merely a reliance on dictionaries, common
meanings, and formal structural analysis. While some
originalists still search for how the relevant generation of
ratifiers expected or intended their textual handiwork would
be applied to specific cases, original meaning originalists need
not concern themselves with this, except as circumstantial evidence of what the more technical words and phrases in the text
might have meant to a reasonable listener.
This aspect of the New Originalism is captured by Ronald
Dworkin's useful distinction between semantic-originalism and
expectations-originalism. 47 "This is the crucial distinction between what some officials intended to say in enacting the language they used, and what they intended-or expected or
hoped-would b~ the consequence of their saying it." 48 In the
context of statutory interpretation, this is the difference "between the question of what a legislature intended to say in the
laws it enacted, which judges applying those laws must answer,
and the question,ofwhat the various legislators as individuals
expected or hoped the consequences of those laws would be, which
is a very different matter." 49 In the context of constitutional
interpretation of the Bill of Rights, "'semantic' originalism .
. . insists that the rights-granting clauses be read to say what
those who made them intended to say"; whereas "'expectation'
originalism ... holds that these clauses should be understood
to have the consequences that those who made them expected
them to have." 50 Dworkin concludes:
[l]fwe read the abstract clauses ofthe Bill of Rights [and
other rights-granting clauses such as the Fourteenth
46. See Gary Lawson, In Praise of Woodenness, GEO. MASON L. REv., Winter, 1988, at 21,
22 & n.8 ( 1988). See generally Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . .. and Constitutions, 85
GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997).
47. See Dworkin, supra note 21, at 116.
48. !d.
49. !d. at 118. Expectations originalism sounds a lot like the "strict intentionalism" criticized by Brest: "Strict intentionalism requires the interpreter to determine how the adopters
would have applied a provision to a given situation, and apply it accordingly." Brest, supra note
3, at 222.
50. Dworkin, supra note 21, at 119. It may be, however, that seemingly abstract provisions
had a narrower original meaning. See infra at notes 102-03.
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Amendment] as they were written-if we read them to say
what their authors intended them to say rather than to
deliver the consequences they expected them to
have-then judges must treat these clauses as enacting
abstract moral principles and must therefore exercise
moral judgment in deciding what they really require.
That does no~ mean ignoring precedent or textual or
historical integrity or morphing the Constitution. It
means, on the contrary, enforcing it in accordance with its
text, in the only way that this can be done. 51
I relate this discussion by Dworkin for two reasons. First,
because, whether or not he himself subscribes to the "semantic
originalist" position, 52 the distinction between "expectations"
and "semantic" originalism helps to clarify the movement from
original intentions originalism to original meaning originalism.
It is not only a movement from subjective to objective meaning.
Depending on the textual provision being interpreted-for some
at least-it is also a movement, to employ another Dworkinian
distinction, from relatively specific rule-like commands to more
abstract principle-like injunctions, the approximate meaning
of which we must still look to the past to discover. Second, it
is another example of how originalism has been rendered safe
enough to tempt even political progressives to adopt it.
But perhaps this shift should not have come as a surprise.
For when you reread Brest and Powell in light of the New
Originalism, you find that both critiques leave considerable
room for originalism to survive and flourish. True, Brest berated
strict textualism along with strict intentionalism, though his
criticisms here are much more limited and less persuasive. 53
51: Dworkin, supra note 21, at 126.
52. He does not. See Dworkin, supra note 22.
53. He argues that one still needs to determine the "social context" which "refers to a shared
understanding ofihe purposes the provision might plausibly serve." Brest, supra note 3, at 206.
"We understand the range of plausible meanings of provisions only because we know that some
interpretations respond to the kinds of concerns that the adopters' society might have while
others do not." /d. at 207. And this, he argues, "calls for a historical inquiry quite similar to the
intentionalist inte~preter's." /d. at 209. After that, however, he primarily considers only the
practical obstacles to determining and aggregating historical intentions. When discussing
textualism, his principal objection is the lack of our ability to situate ourselves adequately
enough in the past to be accurate. See Brest, supra note 3, at 219. However, the well-known
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But he also left the door open, however reluctantly, to what
he terms "moderate intentionalism"-a passage that also reflects
the closeness between textualism and originalism.
A moderate textualist takes account of the open-textured
quality of language and reads the language of provisions
in their social and linguistic contexts. A moderate
intentionalist applies a provision consistent with the
adopters' intent at a relatively high level of generality,
consistent with what is sometimes called the "purpose of
the provision." Where the strict intentionalist tries to
determine the adopters' actual subjective purposes, the
moderate intentionalist attempts to understand what the
adopters' purposes might plausibly have been, an aim far
more readily achieved than a precise understanding of the
adopters' intentions. 54
But if this method is not subject to the same practical objections Brest leveled at strict or original intention originalism,
what is wrong with moderate originalism? Indeed, Brest concedes that "[m]oderate originalism is a perfectly sensible strategy
of constitutional decisionmaking. "55 (I'll bet most of those who
read Brest's article do not remember he said that!) His principal
remaining objection is that moderate originalism has "contributed little to the development of many doctrines [accepted] as
legitimate." 56 This hardly seems like a compelling argument
for or against a particular method of constitutional interpretation-and certainly not of the same magnitude of those criticisms
of original intention originalism for which he is so often cited.
In the end, Brest rejects moderate originalism, not because it
is impossible to achieve, but because it was not used by the
Supreme Court to justify its modern doctrines and that, despite
Brest's claim that the text is "wholly open-ended," 57 moderate
originalism will not support every jot and tittle of constitutional
and widely-accepted reply to this is that we can be accurate enough for practical purposes, or
"good enough for government work." Cf Ronald A. Cass, Trade Subsidy Law: Can a Foolish
Inconsistency Be Good Enough for Government Work?, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 609,
passim (1990) (discussing interpretation of legislation).
54. Brest, supra note 3, at 223.
55. /d.at231.
56. /d.
57. /d.
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doctrine that Brest and others may like.
Similarly, a reexamination of Powell's now-classic historical
treatment of originalism is also a bit surprising. For while he
persuasively argues that the founding generation itself abjured
from original intention originalism, what is generally overlooked
or forgotten is that Powell equally persuasively establishes the
founders' commitment to original meaning originalism:
When a consensus eventually emerged on a proper theory
of constitutional interpretation, it indeed centered on
"original intent." But at the time, that term referred to
the "intentions" of the sovereign parties to the
constitutional compact, as evidenced in the Constitution's
language and discerned through structural methods of
interpretation; it did not refer to the personal intentions
of the framers or of anyone else. 58
This method of constitutional interpretation is closely akin to
methods of contractual interpretation whence it came.
One construed a contract's 'intent' not by embarking
on a historical inquiry into what the parties actually
wished to accomplish, but by applying legal norms to the
contract's terms-that is, by construing the contract in
accordance with the common understanding of its terms,
and in light of its nature and the character of the
contracting parties. 59
In other words, the objective or publicly-accessible meaning of the
terms is sought.
Powell examines in detail James Madison's theory of constitutional interpretation which "rested primarily on the distinction
he drew between the public meaning or intent of a state paper,
a law, or a constitution, and the personal opinions of the individuals who had written or adopted it." 60 Powell cites Madison's
response to an alleged misuse of a veto message he had issued

58. Powell, supra note 4, at 948.
59. /d. at 931 (footnote omitted).
60. /d. at 935.
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as President by his successor Andrew Jackson. Madison wrote:
On the subject of the discrepancy between the
construction put by the Message of the President
[Jackson] on the veto of 1817 and the intention of its
author, the President will of course consult his own view
of the case. For myself, I am aware that the document
. must speak for itself, and that that intention cannot be
substituted for [the intention derived through] the
established rules of interpretation. 61
"Madison was quite insistent," writes Powell, "that a distinction must be drawn between the 'true meaning' of the Constitution and 'whatever might have been the opinions entertained
in forming the Constitution."' 62 And, as Powell shows, Madison
· was not alone in adopting this approach, though it began to erode
and be replaced by a subjective intentions approach as early
as the 1820s. 63 "With the growing availability of original materials revealing the actions and opinions of the individual actors
who played roles in the Constitution's framing and adoption,"
writes Powell, "popular and legal interest in that episode of
history markedly increased." 64 Contrary, then, to how it is commonly used, the historical evidence presented in Professor
Powell's path-breaking article does not undermine an adherence
to the ascendent New Originalism based, not on original intent,
but original meaning. It supports it.
As has been pointed out by others,65 however, Powell's
evidence that the founders opposed reliance on original intent, is
actually evidence that they opposed reliance on the original
intentions of the framers of the Constitution, as opposed to the
understanding of the ratifiers and the people, though interest in the

61. Letter from James Madison to Martin Van Buren (July 5, 1830) as it appears in Powell,
supra note 4, at 936 (bracketed words added by Powell).
62. Powell, supra note 4, at 938 (quoting Letter from James Madison to John Jackson (Dec.
27, 1821), reprinted in 3 LETIERSANDOTHER WRJTINGSOF JAMES MADISON 509,509 (1865).
63. See id. at 944-47.
64. Powell, supra note 4, at 945.
65. This deficiency in Powell's account was pointed out early on, forcefully, and independently by two different scholars. See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism,
and the Interpretation of "This Constitution," 72 IOWA L. REv. 1177 (1987); Charles A.
Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 77 ( 1989).
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intentions of the framers grew by the 1820's. 66 The rejection of
framer's intent followed the Federalists' response to those who
objected to the constitutional convention's having usurped its
original authority to propose changes to the Articles of
Confederation, rather than a complete replacement. Federalists
responded that the convention could only propose a new constitution
which would be a dead letter until ratified by the people through
their state conventions. Their later antipathy to interpretation
based on the original intent of the framers was just an extension of
this earlier argument.
Instead, what Powell's sources actually show is support
for interpreting the Constitution according to the understanding
ofthe ratifying conventions and of the general public who they
represented. As Madison wrote:
As a guide in expounding and applying the provisions of
. the Constitution, the debates and incidental decisions of
the Convention can have no authoritative character.
However desirable it be that they should be preserved as
a gratification to the laudable curiosity felt by every
people to trace the origin and progress of their political
Institutions, and as a source, perhaps, of some lights on
the science of Government, the legitimate meaning of the
Instrument must be derived from the text itself; or if a key
is to be sought elsewhere, it must be, not in the opinions
or intentions of the body which planned and proposed the
Constitution, but in the sense attached to it by the people
in their respective State Conventions, where it received all
the authority which it possesses. 67

Madison was not asserting here the complete irrelevance of the
records of the Convention, but only their authoritative character.
The public meaning of the words of the Constitution, as understood
by the ratifying conventions and the general public, could be gleaned

66. See Powell, supra note 4, at 945 ("With the growing availability of original materials
revealing the actions and opinions of the individual actors who played roles in the Constitution's
framing and adoption, popular and legal interest in that episode of history markedly increased.").
67. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), quoted in 3 THERECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 44 7-48 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
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from a number of sources, including the records of the convention,
but where those intentions differed from the public understanding,
it is the public meaning that should prevail. 68
Moreover, Powell underplays Madison's and others'
commitment to an originalist objective meaning rather than to a
public meaning that evolves over time. 69 As Madison wrote:
I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the
sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified
by the nation. In that sense alone it is the legitimate
Constitution. And if that be not the guide in expounding
it, there can be no security for a consistent and stable,
more than for a faithful, exercise of its powers. If the
meaning of the text be sought in the changeable meaning
of the words composing it, it is evident that the shape and
attributes of the government must partake of the changes
to which the words and phrases of all living languages are
constantly subject. What a metamorphosis would be
produced in the code of law if all its ancient phraseology
were to be taken in its modern sense! And that the
language of our Constitution is already undergoing
interpretations unknown to its founders will, I believe,
appear to all unbiased inquirers into the history of its
origin and adoption. 70
As will become clear, I do not think we are bound by James
Madison's opinions concerning constitutional interpretation.
And as a politician, Madison was not always consistent in his

68. For a discussion of how the issue of"objective" original meaning versus "subjective"
original intent played out in the debate between Lysander Spooner and Wendell Phillips in the
1840's over the constitutionality of slavery, see Randy E. Barnett, Was Slavery Unconstitutional
Before the Thirteenth Amendment?: Lysander Spooner's Theory of Interpretation, 4 PAC. L.J.
977 (1997).
69. See Clinton, supra note 65, at 1186-1220; Lofgren, supra note 65, at 113 ("[T)he
original understanding of original intent most emphatically does not rule out a resort to the
understandings and expectations of the ratifiers in 1787-88, or to the range of materials that may
illuminate their views.").
70. Letter from Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), reprinted in 9.THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 191-92 (G. Hunted. 1910).
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interpretive methodology. 71 Nevertheless, in the balance ofthis
Article we shall see that Madison's reasons for originalismonly an originalist method of interpretation would provide security for a consistent, stable and faithful exercise of the Constitu. tion's powers-are still good reasons for adhering the original
meaning of the text.
Ill. ''WRITTENNESS" AND THE RELEVANCE OF ORIGINAL·
MEANING
Let me now shift my attention from the recent developments
over originalism to the method itself. For even if you disagree
with my claim that aNew Originalism seeking original meaning
rather than original intent is ascendant, what really matters
is not its current popularity but its merit. I have long denied
that I was an originalist because I was largely persuaded by
the multifaceted critique that has been accepted by so many
others. Now I am reconsidering my skepticism. To explain why,
let me first identify the version oforiginalism that I am moving
towards, why it is attractive, and how it resists the objections
that have been made to original intent.
Because I will be relying on insights revealed by contract
law theory, to avoid confusion, let me emphasize up front that
I do not view the Constitution as a contract in a literal sense.
Though I shall say more about this shortly, suffice it to say for
now that, in my view, contracts require the unanimous consent
of all its parties, and the Constitution, indeed any constitution,
must lack this requisite consent. Nevertheless, the Constitution
of the United States is a written document and it is its
writtenness that makes relevant contract law theory pertaining
to those contracts that are also in writing. 72
In short, I shall argue that the impetus behind original
meaning is the same as that which lies behind the statute of
frauds, the parol evidence rule, and the objective theory of con71. See JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT ( 1999) (detailing Madison 's-and others'-shifts in interpretive method over
the course of his congressional career).
72. For a discussion on the centrality of writtenness in our constitutional tradition, see
Calabresi, supra note 41, at 1446-47.
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tractual interpretation. All of these doctrines have been attacked by law professors as backwards and formalist, yet ail
remain with us today. Such is the power of written texts. My
thesis is that the movement to textualism in constitutional law
is motivated by the same sorts of considerations that lead to
textualism in contracts. And original meaning follows naturally,
though not inevitably, from the commitment to a written text.
Let us now examine each of these doctrines in turn to see
whywrittenness is thought important in contract law and why,
despite the important differences between contracts and constitutions, a commitment to a written text entails something like
an original meaning approach to both contractual and constitutional writings.

A. The Functions of Formality Performed by
Writings
Though not all contracts must be in writing, the statute
of frauds requires that agreements of a certain magnitude be
in writing to be enforceable. Why? As Lon Fuller taught us
some sixty years ago, the functions of formality are evidentiary,
·cautionary, and channeling. 73 To these three functions Professors
Calamari and Perillo have added a fourth: the clarifying function.
Here is their description of all four:
Formalities serve important functions in many legal
systems. . . . Important among these is the evidentiary
function. Compliance with formalities provides reliable
evidence that a given transaction took place. A cautionary
function is also served .... Before PE;lrforming the required
ritual the promisor had ample opportunity to reflect and
deliberate on the wisdom of his act. . . . A third function
is an earmarking or channeling function. The populace is
made aware that the use of a given device will attain a
desired result. When the device is used, the judicial task
of determining the parties' intentions is facilitated. A
fourth function is clarification. When the parties reduce
their transaction to writing . . . they are more likely to

73. See Lon L Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L REV. 799,900--01 (1941).

1999]

An Originalism for Nonoriginalists

631

work out details not contained in their oral agreement. In
addition, form requirements can work to serve regulatory
and fiscal ends, to educate the parties as to the full extent
of their obligations, to provide public notice of the
transaction, and also to help management efficiency in an
organizational setting. 74
This is also a pretty good summary ofwhy, from the Magna
Carta forward, there has always been an interest in getting
political commitments in writing. Though they differ in significant ways, putting a constitution in writing performs many of
the same functions as written contracts. A written constitution
provides good evidence of what terms were actually enacted,
when they might later be disputed. The fact that the original
constitution and subsequent amendments were in writing induced
deliberation and caution in those considering whether to formally
adopt the new text. (Depending on your views of why they failed
to be ratified, the flag burning amendment or the equal rights
amendment illustrate the value of deliberation and caution.)
Formal methods of adding written amendments permit people
seeking to modify the Constitution to channel their actions
accordingly, knowing that if they satisfy the requisite procedures
their actions will have a legally binding effect and the authoritative text will be changed. Finally, the act of hammering out
· the terms ofthe Constitution and later amendments in writing
causes people to clarify their meaning and intentions in a way
that a vague general agreement to informally expressed rules
or principles could never do.
While the functions of formality help explain the appeal
of a written constitution, the impetus for an original meaning
method of interpretation is also suggested by the parol evidence
rule. When a writing can be contradicted by oral testimony
of a differing understanding, the purposes for which the agreement was put in writing in the first place would be undercut.
In other words, for all its difficulties, something like a parol
evidence rule is needed to preserve the original meaning of the
writing and thereby enable it to fulfill the evidentiary, caution-

74. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 294 (3d ed. 1987) (emphasis
added).
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ary, channeling and clarification functions offormality. Ifwe
let writings be contradicted by extrinsic evidence-even evidence
of changed intentions-then they lose their ability to perform
these functions.
A focus on the parol evidence rule and its value in preserving
the function of a writing is helpful in other respects. First, as
Tom Grey has noticed, while the parol evidence rule bars the
use of extrinsic evidence to contradict a writing, unless the
writing is completely integrated-that is, it is not only the final
written expression of the parties' agreement, but is also the
sole and exclusive statement of their agreement-it may be
supplemented in ways that do not contradict its terms. 75 Contradicting the explicit provisions of a writing undermines its ability
to satisfy the functions of formality in a way that supplementing
it when it is incomplete or when it explicitly authorizes
supplementation does not.
Whether the Constitution can be supplemented depends,
then, on the nature of its terms. Grey argues that the Ninth
Amendment explicitly authorizes supplementation, but I leave
this important issue to one side because it bears only indirectly
on the issue of the appropriate method of interpretation which
is needed to tell us, among other things, what the Ninth Amendment really means. For we cannot know if the Ninth Amendment
authorizes supplementation until we know how to interpret
its words.
This then brings us to the issue of how the words of a writing
are themselves to be interpreted. In contract law, the objective
approach looks to the publicly-accessible meaning that a reasonable person would attach to these words in context. The reasons
for this are important. Because people cannot read each other's
minds, they must rely on appearances when making their decision whether to enter or refrain from entering into a contractual
relationship. Thus, though we are concerned about the intentions
of the parties; we are only concerned about those intentions
which the parties have succeeded in manifesting to each other,
and not with any subjective intentions that went uncommunicated. For this reason, we rely on the public or objective meaning
75. See Grey, supra note 16, at 223-29.
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of the contractual terms.
The same is true of constitutions. The Constitution is a
law that governs the lawmakers. They and those they govern
are entitled to rely on the Constitution's appearances every
bit as much as parties to private contracts, and for the same
reasons. We cannot read other people's minds. Moreover, if
it matters that a constitution is ratified by the people or any
segment thereof, to what are they agreeing if the only meanings
that exist are secret ones in their heads or in the heads of those
who wrote the paper? As nineteenth century radical abolitionist
and legal theorist Lysander Spooner observed:
We must admit that the constitution, of itself,
independently of the actual intentions of the people,
expresses some certain fixed, definite, and legal
intentions; else the people themselves would express no
intention by agreeing to it. The instrument would, in fact,
C!)ntain nothing that the people could agree to. Agreeing
to an instrument that had no meaning of its own, would
only be agreeing to nothing. 76
In other words, "if the intentions could be assumed independently
of the words, the words would be of no use, and the laws of course
would not he written.'m
The seeming paradox of determining "intentions" without
relying on evidence of particular subjective intent is routinely
resolved by the fact that the English language contains words
with generally accepted meanings that are ascertainable independently of any one of our subjective opinions about that meaning. The most common way of doing this is by resorting to dictionaries, and this is a useful starting point. But when interpreting
the meaning conveyed by a writing, whether it is a contract or
a constitution, one must take the context in which a word or
phrase appears into account, combined with how these words
are used elsewhere in the document and the general purposes
for these clauses that can be ascertained from the document

76.
77.

LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 222 (enlarged ed. 1860).
SPOONER, supra note 76, at 220.
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itself and from circumstances surrounding its formation. None
of these interpretive inquiries, by the way, violates (or should
violate 78 ) the parol evidence rule.
However, given that the meanings ofwords can change or
evolve, in searching for the "generally accepted" or reasonable
meaning within a particular community of discourse, at what
point in time do we look for the meaning? Here is where
textualism meets and melds with originalism. With a constitution, as with a contract, we look to the meaning established·
at time of formation and for the same reason: if either a constitution or contract is reduced to writing and executed, where it
speaks it establishes a rule oflaw from that moment forward.
Adopting any meaning contrary to the original meaning would
be to contradict or change the meaning of the text in violation
of the parol evidence rule and thereby to undermine the value
ofwrittenness. Put another way, writtenness ceases to perform
its function if meaning can be changed in the absence of an
equally written modification or amendment.
For this reason, virtually all written contracts require
modifications to be in writing. 79 The need for written modification or amendment is driven by the same desideratum of formality that recommends a -written constitution in the first place. 80
In sum, meaning must remain the same unless it is changed,
and changes require the same degree ofwrittenness and formality as the original writing. A commitment to textualism, therefore, begets a commitment to original meaning unless this meaning is altered by a written amendment.

78. See E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law ofContracts, 76 YALE L. J. 939,951-65
(1967).
79. The issue of"waiver" clauses requiring express modification, while not exactly beyond
the scope of this Article, would take us too far afield into the realm of contract law. Suffice it
to say that waivers must be consented to by all the parties, and such unanimous consent is
unobtainable in this constitutional context for the same reason it is unavailable at the formation
stage.
80. The fact that amendments ought to be in writing does not necessarily entail the position
that the method of ratification of written amendments need be limited to those specified in the
original writing if they are not reasonably interpreted as exclusive. The functional desirability
of ratifying written amendments by unwritten procedures is separate from the imperative that
amendments, however ratified, themselves be in writing.
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By this route, we have arrived at the original meaning
position in just the way that Powell showed the founders did
-by analogy to contract law. But as I have already emphasized,
this analogy, like all analogies, has its limits. Contract law
recognizes that a subjective agreement between the parties can
trump the objective meaning either to show a mistake in integration, or to show that the parties attached an idiosyncratic meaning to a particular term. 81 Even if the Constitution is a kind
of contract, there are simply too many parties ever to find unanimous agreement to an idiosyncratic meaning. 82
Far from undermining originalism, though, this difference
between contracts and constitutions bolsters its importance.
For the "original" meaning of written contracts can be overridden,
in a sense, by subsequent conduct that constitutes a unanimous
consensual modification or waiver of its provisions. If, however,
unanimous consent never exists to justify a constitution's formation, neither can it exist to justify the modification or waiver
of its written terms, for example by later acquiescence to judicial
interpretations that contradict the original meaning. Later
acquiescence to a change in meaning can no more be taken as
unanimous consent, than acquiescence at the time of the founding. Unlike written contracts, then, in the absence of a unani.mous consent to modify a constitution, a proper respect for the
writtenness of the text means that those committed to this
Constitution have no choice but to respect the original meaning
of its text until it is formally amended in writing. Otherwise,

81. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 7.9, at 461 (3d ed. 1999):
In the rare cases of a common meaning shared by both parties, the subjectivists have had the better
of the argument. Though it is generally safe to say that a party's "secret intention" will not carry
the day, this is not a safe assertion if it happens that both parties shared the same "secret intention."
See also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REv.
II 07, 1125 ( 1984)("The rule that a mutually held subjective interpretation is determinative even
if it is objectively unreasonable is well-supported by authority.").
82. Since he viewed the Constitution as a contract, this argument figured in Spooner's
analysis of the unconstitutionality of slavery. Because the framers of the Constitution used
euphemisms for the terms "slavery" or "slave,"
[i]fthere were a single honest man in the nation, who assented, in good faith, to the honest and legal
meaning of the constitution, it would be unjust and unlawful towards him to change the meaning
of the instrument so as to sanction slavery, even though every other man in the nation should testifY
that, in agreeing to the constitution, he intended that slavery should be sanctioned.
SPOONER, supra note 76, at 123.
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writtenness will fail to perform its vital functions. 83
Let me be very clear about the claim I just made. My argument, to this point is, that we are not bound to respect the original meaning of a text by the Dead Hand of the past. We are
bound because we today-right here, right' now-profess our
commitment to a written constitution, and original meaning
interpretation follows inexorably from that commitment. We
can easily jettison that original meaning by disclaiming our
commitment to a written constitution, but this is a choice both
courts and scholars have been generally unwilling to make.

B. Original Meaning and Constitutional Legitimacy
But there is another reason why the so-called "Dead Hand"
argument is not as powerful as it seems. To see this, we must
distinguish between two different issues that are usually conflated both by originalists and by their critics. The first issue
is why, given our commitment to a written constitution, we are
committed to the original meaning of its text. This is the issue
I have already addressed by analogy to written contracts. The
second is whether and why we are committed to any particular
written constitution (interpreted properly).
It is with the second of these issues that the analogy to
contracts breaks down completely. Most originalists contend
that the U.S. Constitution is binding solely because "the People"
ratified or consented to it. But contracts require unanimous
consent, a degree of consent no constitution can claim. Given
the lack of unanimous consent, popular sovereignty originalists
have taken the analogy to contracts too far.

In myview, with contracts, consent to be legally bound can
create a binding obligation to pretty much anything short of
an agreement to violate the rights of others or to transfer one's

83. It is true, of course, that written amendments are never adopted by unanimous consent.
It is not consent, however, but the fact that (a) changes have been ratified in conformity with
procedures dictated by the original text, and (b) the changes are themselves in writing, that result
in their incorporation into the text of Constitution-and then to be interpreted according to their
original meaning at the time of ratification.
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own inalienable rights. 84 Unlike a contract, however, a constitution purports to govern even those who did not consent to it
at the founding-women, children, former slaves, resident aliens,
disenfranchised prisoners, future generations, etc. Nor even
today can resident aliens, children, future generations and the
inevitably disenfranchised for reasons of criminality or mental
incapacity, consent to amendments. Consent, therefore, cannot
count in the way that the concept of popular sovereignty would
require to impart legitimacy on any constitution. 85 For it has
never been satisfactorily explained how a majority or minority
calling themselves "the People," 86 by exercising their will, can
bind anyone but themselves. 87
The consensual difference between contracts and constitutions does not detract from the vital functions performed by
a constitution's writtenness, which entails, for the reasons given
in the previous section, a commitment to originalism in both
contractual and constitutional interpretation. But, while even
a limited consent may play a very useful checking function that
we would ignore at our peril, 88 consent does not ofitselflegiti-

84. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL.
&POL'Y 179 (1986).
85. Anyone who wishes to argue to the contrary should begin by reading and responding to
LYSANDER SPOONER, No TREASON No. VI: THE CONSTITUTION OF NO AUTHORITY ( 1870).
86. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A

Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REv.
1269, 1291 (1997) ("The people's representatives have a right to govern, so long as they do not
transgress limits on their authority that are fairly traceable to the constitutional precommitments
of the people themselves .... ).
·
87. Though I am aware of arguments based on tacit consent or on the voluntary receipt of
benefits, an examination of these purported justifications is beyond the scope of this Article. I
will merely say here that, while implied consent can result in a contract, the sort of extended
amorphous "tacit" consent relied upon to justify constitutional obligation would not, like the
mere receipt of a benefit conferred, support anything more than a "quasi-contract," which is
really a separate basis of restitutionary, not contractual, obligation. More importantly, on either
these alternative accounts, it is not the consent of the majority that binds the minority.
88. On the other hand, the initial "consent of the governed" may contribute to the legitimacy
of a resultant constitution by providing a prudential check against the imposition of a lawmaking
system that is illegitimate because it is procedurally inadequate. Presumably, a large group of
people would not consent to a system that did not provide the requisite assurances, though it is
not at all clear that this presumption would equally reflect the probable justice of enacted laws
imposed upon persons and groups who were never asked for their consent. Though, in my view,
the consent of some does not of itself provide a sufficient assurance of legitimacy for everyone,
a ratification process that includes a requirement of the "consent" of a large group of ratifiers
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mate the terms of a constitution as it does (within limits) the
terms of private contracts. 89 In this regard, then, I part company from the many originalists, both old and new, who base
their originalism on notions of popular sovereignty.
Originalists who ground their interpretive theory in popular-sovereignty have confused a "rule of recognition"-a concept
made famous by H.L.A. Hart-with the conditions of constitutionallegitimacy. A rule of recognition is the way the population
can identify the existence of an operating legal regime. 90 But
just as knowing merely that a particular command is "the law"
does not tell us whether it is binding in conscience, knowing
that a legal regime "exists" as a result of some form of ratification
is not the same thing as knowing there is a moral duty to obey
its commands.
Of course, some form of general acquiescence is necessary
for any constitution to be implemented and to maintain its continued existence as positive law. As Frederick Schauer has noted,
this acquiescence distinguishes the Constitution ofthe United
States from another document entitled, "The Constitution of
the United States," I might write and have my friends ratify. 91

might serve to induce a deliberative process that does help assure that the resulting system has
the procedural features that themselves are the source oflegitimacy. The existence of that partial
consent, however, is neither sufficient nor necessary (e.g. Japan's constitution), to provide that
legitimacy.
89. Some contract theorists see consent playing the same limited legitimating role in contracts as I see it playing in constitution making, insofar as the existence of consent provides
rebuttable evidence of the fairness of a bargain. But this is a debate that is well beyond the scope
of this Article. Conceptually, I am claiming that consent plays a justice-providing role in contract formation but only (part of) a legitimacy-providing role in forming a constitution, whereas
they view consent as providing only a legitimacy providing role in contracts.
90. See H.L.A. HART, THECONCEPTOFLAW 92-93 (1961) (A rule of recognition is "a rule
for conclusive identification of the primary rules of obligation."). Notice Hart's reference here
to the "rules of obligation." Hart also contended that, if the rule of recognition was satisfied,
citizens would then not only be compelled or "obliged" to obey the law, they would also be
under an "obligation" or moral duty to obey. See id. at 80. This I reject for reasons I have given
elsewhere. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF
LAw 17-23 (1998). And this is conceded by those modern positivists who deny that the mere
legality of a command entails a duty of obedience. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW 233 ( i 979) ("[T]here is no obligation to obey the law .... [T]here is not even a prima facie
obligation to obey it.").
91. Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional Norms
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45, 52 (1994) ("[O]nly one of these 'Constitutions' would be the
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Ratification by plebiscite or representative conventions can
provide an effective rule of recognition to the population and
help attain a general acquiescence to the constitutional regime.
But mere acquiescence, however acquired, which every existing
government and scheme of positive law can claim, and unanimous
consent cannot be the same thing.
For what is at issue here is whether a particular constitutional regime is legitimate, by which I mean, is capable of issuing
commands to the citizenry that bind individuals in conscience.
If acquiescence, which every functioning regime can claim,
equaled unanimous consent, even the most oppressive regime
could claim to be entitled to a duty of obedience on the basis
of such "consent." Clearly this proves too much. While some
degree of acquiescence may be necessary to establish a command
as positive law, then, more than acquiescence is needed to create
a moral duty to obey such a command. Consent by the individual,
were it to exist, would do the trick-but one individual or generation cannot consent for another, and unanimous consent, all
concede, cannot and has never existed.
If the less-than-unanimous consent that actually exists
cannot create a duty of obedience in those who have not consented, what can? This is a critical question that I have begun
to address elsewhere and which I cannot fully address here.
For the moment, let me state my thesis. What legitimates a
constitution, if anything does, is the merits of the lawmaking
process it establishes. In particular, does it establish a system
oflawmaking that provides some assurance that laws demanding
obedience passed under its auspices are both necessary and
proper. By proper, I mean (among other things) that such laws
are not unjust in the sense that they do not violate the background or "natural" rights of those upon whom they are
imposed. 92

Constitution of the United States, because only one of these documents would have been accepted, socially and politically, by the people of the United States as their Constitution.").
92. For an extended treatment of what those background rights are, see BARNETI, supra note
84.
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Legitimacy, on this view, is the conceptuallynchpin between
legal validity and justice. 93 A constitution is legitimate if it
regulates the lawmaking powers it authorizes in such a manner
as to provide an assurance that validly-made laws are necessary
and will not violate rights. Laws that are validly produced by
such a system are not only valid; they are also legitimate and
carry with them a prima facie duty of obedience. 94 Legitimacy
does not require an unattainable perfect guaranty that every
law will be just; only an assurance that, based on the way they
are made and enforced, laws enacted pursuant to constitutional
processes are necessary and not likely to violate the rights retained by the people and, therefore, such laws deserve the benefit
of the doubt. In this way, legitimacy requires both substantive
and procedural "due process" of law. 95
The relationship between a written constitution and legitimacy is two-fold. First, constitutional legitimacy depends on
what the writing says. Are its provisions sufficient to create
a lawmaking process that produces necessary and proper commands that bind in conscience even those who did not consent
to it? For the laws that result from a constitutional process
to be legitimately imposed on those who have not consented,
the lawmaking procedures implemented by such a constitution

93. See Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role ofNatural Rights in Constitutional
Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 93, 98 (1995).
By "legitimacy," I do not mean the question of whether a particular law is "valid" because it was
enacted according to the accepted legal process . . . . Nor do I equate the legitimacy of a law with
its "justice" . . . . Rather, the concept of legitimacy that I am employing refers to whether the
process by which a law is determined to be valid is such as to warrant that the law is just.

!d. Thus, a "law may be 'valid' because produced in accordance to all procedures required by
a particular lawmaking system, but still be 'illegitimate' because these procedures are inadequate
to provide assurances that a law is just." !d. at 98 n.19. And a "law might be 'legitimate'
because produced according to procedures that assure that it is just, and yet be 'unjust' because
in this case the procedures (which can never be perfect) have failed." !d. at 98 n.20; see also
Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Legitimacy, 64
CHI.-KENTL. REv. 37 (1988).
94. By the same token, some form of ratification and acquiescence might render a constitution valid. But the validity-of a constitution and its legitimacy, meaning the moral obligatoriness
of the commands issued under its auspices, are two different things. Anything short of unanimous consent cannot bind non-consenting parties.
95. By "substantive" due process, I mean that legislatures should not have the final word on
whether their commands violate the rights retained by the people. A citizen is entitled to seek
the judgment of the judiciary on this question.
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must give assurances that lawmaking and law enforcement will
not violate the background rights
retained by the
people-whether or not they consented to its implementation.
Second, assuming that the lawmaking process initially
established by a written constitution is legitimate, the fact that
a constitution says the right things in writing helps assure that
these provisions will be respected over time-an assurance that
an unwritten constitution or a written constitution that can
be freely modified by legislative practice or judicial opinion
cannot provide. In this way, constitutional legitimacy, rather
than popular sovereignty or consent, can ground a commitment
to originalism.
An important reason why a written constitution is preferable
to the alternatives then, is that it helps keep a legitimate legal
regime legitimate over time. And this advantage can only be
obtained if the meaning of the constitution does not change by
mere judicial interpretation. In sum, unlike an "originalist"
interpretation of a written contract which protects even bad
choices by consenting parties, for an originalist interpretation
of a written constitution to be legitimate, it must be in service
of a constitution that makes the right choices by protecting the
rights of non-consenting persons.

One feature of the lawmaking system that was established
(for better or worse) in 1789 as a matter of positive law, and
that differs from other legal systems, is the centrality of a written constitution that is supposed to perform evidentiary, cautionary, channeling, and clarifying functions-functions that would
be entirely defeated if extrinsic evidence or considerations could
be used to contradict its terms. We can imagine a legal system
that was not based on a written constitution, 96 did not separate
powers between the three branches of government, 97 did not
preserve a federal system, 98 or did not contain a Bill ofRights, 99
but that is not the system that was established in 1789 and,
as formally amended beginning in 1791, has been in continuous
96.
97.
98.
99.

For example, the United Kingdom.
For example, some state governments prior to the Constitution.
For example, the first French Republic.
For example, the U.S. Constitution between 1789 and 1791.
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operation ever since.
To anyone who says that the written terms of the Constitution have been superceded by acquiescence to legislative practice
or judicial opinion as a matter of positive law, I reply that this
would only be the case if the legislature and courts explicitly
renounce their reliance on the written Constitution. This they
would dare not do, for by so doing they would renounce as well
the authority they claim to be exercising and they could not
safely predict acquiescence to that. By pledging fealty to a
written constitution they deprive their interpretive subversion
of any claim to consent by acquiescence.
Does originalism grounded on considerations oflegitimacy
(as I am using the term), rather than on popular sovereignty
or consent, mean that the original meaning of a constitutional
provision can be overridden whenever we conclude it conflicts
with justice? If so, is this not a very weak justification of
originalism and one that fails to control judicial activism? One
answer is that legitimacy is not to be confused with justice.
Legitimacy is the quality a legal system has to assure recipients
of its commands that is performing necessary functions without
violating individual rights; that is, its commands are both necessary and proper. If the process by which these commands are
issued is legitimate, then there is a prima facie duty to obey
any validly-made command even ifit turns out that it is unjust.
Moreover, ordinary legislation, which potentially can be
overridden by considerations of justice if the constitution so
permits, should not be confused with a constitution which cannot.
A system that fails to scrutinize statutes to ensure that they
do not violate the background rights retained by the people might
not be legitimate. Whether our system does or does not authorize
such scrutiny, however, is to be determined by interpreting and
construing a written constitution properly-and that means
according to its original meaning.
In other words, because the original meaning and proper
construction of the Constitution permit rights to trump statutes
within the lawmaking system it establishes, this does not mean
that rights trump the Constitution, as a matter of positive law.
Nor does it mean that judges are authorized to disregard the
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original meaning of the Constitution when, in their sole opinion,
this meaning violates the background rights retained by the
people. This would be to undercut the writtenness that is necessary to preserve an initially legitimate system.
In sum, to decide whether a particular written constitution
creates a legitimate process of lawmaking requires, first, an
interpretation of its meaning and, second, and evaluation of
whether the process created by that meaning is "good enough"
to impart legitimacy on validly made laws. Step two of this
assessment oflegitimacy does not entail any duty or power to
disregard the meaning determined in step one. To the contrary,
it takes that meaning as given and evaluates it. 100
Judicial "activism," of the sort usually complained of, is
only problematic when originalism is justified on grounds of
popular sovereignty or consent and a judge's actions are seen
as "countermajoritarian." When originalism is justified on
grounds of consti tu tionallegitimacy, however, some" activism"
in pursuit of justice is not a vice. It may very well be a necessary
component of a legitimate lawmaking system.
But
"activism"-whether by judges or by Congress-that conflicts
with the original meaning of constitutional provisions, to the
degree this meaning is ascertainable and unambiguous (more
on this shortly), is forbidden by the commitment to preserve,
protect, and defend a written constitution.

C. Some Caveats
Before I examine how original meaning originalismjustified
in this manner withstands the accepted critique of originalism,
let me offer a few caveats on the limits of the analysis just presented. First, although I have claimed that the writtenness
of a constitution entails a commitment to an original meaning
that cannot be contradicted by later meanings or intentions,
I have not claimed that the U.S. Constitution is a completely
integrated writing. The original meaning of the terms of the
Cons.titution as amended-such as the Ninth Amendment, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, etc.-might well authorize

100. Judges in a fundamentally illegitimate system might have different duties.
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supplementation of its express terms in ways that do not contradict its original meaning. But to determine whether this is true,
we must examine the original meanings of these open-textured
provisions. About this originalists may differ among themselves.101
Second, with any theory of textual interpretation, not just
originalism, there is a need to establish the appropriate degree
of abstraction or generality which properly attaches to particular
provisions. Obviously, some parts of the Constitution are more
specific and rule-like, while others are more abstract and princi- ·
pie-like. The equal protection and due process clauses are good
examples of the latter. Though these clauses do not authorize
supplementation in the way that the Ninth Amendment and
Privileges or Immunities clauses do, they might well require
resort to teleological or purposive considerations to determine
their appropriate meaning as applied to a particular problem
in a manner that would be impermissible when interpreting,
say, the age requirement for holding office.
To at least some extent, however, the degree of generality
is itself an historical question. In light ofthe context and usage
at the time, how general was a term or phrase at the time it
was used? Answering this question is necessary to discover
the "objective" or reasonable meaning of a term at the time of
either contract or constitutional formation. In sum, determining
original meaning entails determining the level of generality
with which a particular term was used. As Keith Whittington
has argued, "[t]he level of generality at which terms were defined
is not an a priori theoretical question but a contextualized historical one. In some instances, the founders may have used terms
quite expansively, and at other times seemingly broad terms

101. For an originalist who contests the view that the Ninth Amendment authorizes textual
supplementation, see Thomas B. McAffee,.Prolegomena to a Meaningful Debate of the "Unwritten Constitution" Thesis, 61 U. CINN. L. REV. I 07, 149-50 (1992). It is more difficult to
characterize the positions of those originalists who take issue with Michael Curtis' view of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, but a useful compendium is contained in Bret. Boyce,
Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 909 ( 1998) (discussing
the views of, among others, Raoul Berger, John Harrison, Earl Maltz, and William Nelson).
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were conceptualized at a relatively narrow level." 102
Interpreting the meaning of the Constitution requires an
historical inquiry into the degree of generality or abstradion
the framers meant to convey when using certain words or
phrases. 103 Any lack of determinacy that remains, however,
is one of the prices we (or the framers) pay for a writing that
uses abstract principles in place of specific rules; it is also one
of the well-known virtues of this particular writing.
Third, and somewhat relatedly, constitutional interpretation
must be distinguished from, and does not preclude, constitutional
construction. 104 Due to either ambiguity or generality, the original meaning of the text may not always determine a unique
rule of law to be applied to a particular case or controversy.
While not indeterminate, its meaning is underdeterniinate. 105
When this happens, interpretation must be supplemented by
constitutional construction-within the bounds established by
original meaning. The preceding discussion of constitutional

102. WHITIINGTON, supra note 9, at 187. This claim is more elaborately explained in the
context ofRonald Dworkin's characterization of original ism in Keith E. ~hittington, Dworkin's
"Originalism ": The Role ofIntentions in Constitutional Interpretation, 62 REVIEW OF POLITICS
(forthcoming Spring 2000). See also, McConnell, supra note 86, at 1280 ("A genuine commitment to the semantic intentions of the Framers requires the interpreter to seek the level of generality at which the particular language was understood by its Framers.").
103. But cf Ronald Dworkin, Reflections on Fidelity, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1799, 1808
(1997) ([T]here is no such thing as the level of generality at which someone's moral opinions
are most accurately reported, though there is such a thing as the most accurate report ofthe level
of generality at which a person spoke on some particular occasion." (emphasis added)).
I 04. On the distinction between interpretation and construction, see WHITTINGTON, supra
note 9, at 7.
Constitutional interpretation is essentially legalistic, but constitutional construction is essentially
political. Its precondition is that parts ·or the constitutional text have no discoverable meaning.
Although the clauses and structures that make up the text cannot be simply empty of meaning, for
they are clearly recognizable as language, the meaning that they do convey may be so broad and
underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful reduction to legal rules .... Regardless of the extent
of judicial interpretation of certain aspects of the Constitution, there will remain an impenetrable
sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered. The judiciary may be able to delimit textual
meaning, hedging in the possibilities, but after all judgments have been rendered specifying
discoverable meaning, major indeterminacies may remain. The specification of a single governing
meaning from these possibilities requires an act of creativity beyond interpretation .... This additional step is the construction of meaning.
!d.; see also KEITH E. WHITIINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1-19 ( 1999).
105. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54

U. CHI. L. REv. 462,473 (1987) (distinguishing between indeterminacy and underdeterminacy).
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legitimacy suggests an important criterion for determining such
constructions.
Because lawmakers acting pursuant to their constitutional
powers govern those who did not consent, to be legitimate, the
lawmaking processes must provide assurances that both the
enumerated and unenumerated rights of those who are governed
will not be violated. To enhance legitimacy, then, ambiguous
terms should be given the meaning that is most respectful of
the rights of all who are affected and rules of construction most
respectful of these rights should be adopted to put general constitutional provisions into legal effect. An example of such a rule
of construction (though statutory, not constitutional) is provided
by Chief Justice Marshall, who stated that "[w]here rights are
infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where
the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative
intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a
court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objec~s." 106
One can call this making the Constitution "the best it can
be," 107 as Ronald Dworkin might, but this method of construction-as distinct from interpretation -is only appropriate when
terms are genuinely ambiguous or when the original level of
generality can be satisfied by more than one rule o~ law . 108 It
should not be used to change the original meaning of the Constitution without adhering to the formalities governing amendments
that are needed to preserve its integrity as a written constitution
Enhancing constitutional legitimacy, in the sense I am using
the term, might also require construing abstract constitutional
rights as broadly as the original meaning of the text permits,
while construing narrowly the delegated powers. 109 Or one might
adopt a "presumption of liberty" that places the onus ofjustification on the government to show that any interference with a

106. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805) (emphasis added). Though
Marshall uses the term "intention," Powell makes clear that the founding generation took an
"objective" approach to determining such intentions. See Powell, supra note 4, at 904. For a
discussion of how Lysander Spooner used this as a canon of constitutional construction sufficiently powerful to call the constitutionality of slavery into question, see Barnett, supra note 63.
107. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 62 (1986).
108. See Dworkin, supra note 22, at 1259-60.
I 09. See Randy E. Barnett, Necessary & Proper, 44 UCLA L. REv. 745, 786-87 (1997).
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citizen's rightful exercise of liberty is both necessary and
proper. 110 In the words of St. George Tucker, a leading constitutional scholar and jurist at the time of the founding:
All the powers of the federal government being either
expressly enumerated, or necessary and proper to the
execution of some enumerated power; and it being one of
the rules of construction which sound reason has adopted;
that, as exception strengthens the force of a law in cases
not excepted, so enumeration weakens it, in cases not
enumerated; it follows, as a regular consequence, that
every power which concerns the right of the citizen, must
be construed strictly, where it may operate to infringe or
impair his liberty; and liberally, and for his benefit, where
it may operate to his security and happiness, the avowed
object of the constitution .... 111
In sum, when the original public meaning of a term or provision in a written constitution fails to provide a unique rule of
law to apply to a particular case, it still provides a "frame" that,
while excluding many possibilities, requires choice among the
set of unexcluded alternatives. 112 When such choices must be
made, rules of construction that ( 1) are consistent with original
meaning and (2) ensure the legitimacy of the lawma}.dng process
ought to be adopted.
Finally, I do not claim to have answered all the questions
concerning how one arrives at the original meaning of a particular constitutional provision, though the sorts of questions that
need to be answered are as difficult for any other method of
interpretation that purports to take the text seriously even where

110. See Barnett, supra note 109, at 787-88; see also Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger,
The "Proper" Scope ofFederal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation ofthe Sweeping Clause,
43 DUKEL.J. 267,317-18 (1993).
Ill. St. George Tucker, Appendix to l WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 307-08 (St.
George Tuckered., 1803). The passage quoted in the text is a portion of Tucker's commentary
on the import of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. See id.
112. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 430 ( 1985) ("The language
of a [constitutional] clause, whether seemingly general or seemingly specific, establishes a
boundary, or frame, albeit a frame with fuzzy edges. Even though the language itself does not
tell us what goes on within the frame, it does tell us when we have gone outside it."(footnote
omitted)). ·
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it does not result in "happy endings." 113 My purpose is merely
to identify a shift from a subjective originalism that cannot
withstand the practical objections that have been offered against
it to an objective originalism that can. And I believe I have
also provided a justification for such a method ofinterpretation
that can avoid the problems that attach to arguments based
on consent and popular sovereignty and can appeal to those
who consider themselves to be nonoriginalists. So let me now
turn to these objections to see how fares the New Originalism
based on original meaning and justified on grounds, not of popular sovereignty or consent, but of constitutional legitimacy.

IV. HANDLING THE OBJECTIONS TO 0RIGINALISM
How does a New Originalism based on original meaning
meet the several criticisms that have been leveled at theories
based on original intent-criticisms that, as I already
mentioned, 114 persuaded me that I was not an originalist? The
very same historical evidence offered by Powell in opposition
to original intent supports original meaning based on "the public
meaning or intent of a state paper." 115 And this public meaning
is "evidenced in the Constitution's language and discerned
through structural methods of interpretation; it did not refer
to the perso;nal intentions of the framers or of anyone else," 116
including those who "adopted it." 117
If the reasons I am offering for why original meaning should
be the starting point of constitutional interpretation are correct,
however, it ultimately does not matter if this was the method
intended or practiced by the founders. There are independent
normative reasons for adopting it anyhow. Nevertheless, the
fact that the founding generation quickly settled on this method
(before it was eventually abandoned) should give us confidence
that it makes sense. And it undercuts any appearance of contradiction.

113. See Hemy P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353,356 (1981);
cf RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 38 (1996) ("It is in the nature of legal interpretation-not just but particularly constitutional interpretation-to aim at happy endings.").
114. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
115. Powell, supra note 4, at 935.
116. !d. at 948.
117. !d. at 935.
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What of the objection against originalism made by Brest
and others that it is simply too hard to discern the intentions
ofthe Framers? We have already seen how, while arguing strenuously that establishing the sort of intentions required by a
strict originalism was impractical, Brest conceded the efficacy
of a more moderate originalism. Yet even his criticisms of strict
original intent originalism have been answered with some persuasiveness by Richard Kay.
When making the binary decisions of whether a particular
act of government is within or without its powers, or has or has
not violated a background right, Kay contends that "all [we need]
to do is decide which of the two possible answers ... is more
likely correct." 118 Picking one of two alternatives, though sometimes difficult, is far from impossible.

It is true that we can never know the original intentions
with certainty, but then we can never know any speaker's
or writer's intent with certainty. Nevertheless, it is
almost always possible to examine the constitutional text
and other evidence of intent associated with it and make
a reasonable, good faith judgment about which result is
more likely consistent with that intent. Of course
confidence in these judgments will be different in different
situations, but one answer will almost always appear
better than the other. Indeed, one of the two possible
responses may be obviously incorrect because, while it is
theoretically possible that the lawmakers held such an
intention, the available historical evidence will be
overwhelmingly against it. 119
I

What is true of original intentions is true a fortiori of the concededly
easier-to-discern original meaning. 120
Moreover, that which exists is possible to exist. Compelling
analyses of the original meaning of even the most controversial

118. Kay, supra note 9, at 244.
119. /d.
120. See also WHITIINGTON, supra note 9, at 187-95 (discussing the problem of summing
intentions).
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provisions of the Constitution have been developed, from those
where the evidence of original meaning is simply overwhelming-the Second Amendment, for example 121-or closer but still
persuasive as it is with the Ninth Amendment 122 and the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 123 Indeed, the p·ast fifteen years
has yielded a boon tide of originalist scholarship that has established the original meanings of several clauses that had previously been shrouded in mystery primarily for want of serious
inquiry. 124 Like any other form oflegal argument, a commitment
to original meaning requires us only to respect the meaning
supported by the most persuasive evidence.
That original meaning originalism is possible is also evidenced by the respect we have seen that it receives from such
scholars as Bruce Ackerman, AkhilAmar, Ronald Dworkin and,
when speaking of moderate originalism, even Paul Brest himself.
Though not all originalists themselves, these and other thoughtful scholars do not dismiss the original meaning originalism
as impractical. There remains, of course, the difficult and important problem of producing a synthetic meaning of the Constitution from provisions enacted at different times by different
generations. But, fortunately for me, this problem has received
close attention from Bruce Ackerman and, at this point, I refer
the interested reader to his analysis. 125

121. See Barnett & Kates, supra note 10 (summarizing this evidence and providing citations
to the literature).
122. See Randy E. Barnett, James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in I THE RIGHTS RETAINED
BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 1-49 (Randy E.
Barnett, ed., 1989); Randy E. Barnett, Implementing the Ninth Amendment, in 2 THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OFTHE NINTH AMENDMENT 1-46 (Randy
E. Barnett, ed., 1993 ).
123. See CURTIS, supra note 29.
124. Yet another reason for concluding that originalism is alive and well.
125. See I ACKERMAN, supra note 30, at 131-62 (providing syntheses Of the founding with
the Reconstruction and alleged New Deal amendments to the Constitution). Though I generally
approve of his approach to the issue of synthesis, I do not agree that unwritten changes to the
Constitution are binding and therefore need be synthesized with those provisions that are in
writing. The issue is not, as Ackerman believes, simply about whether the method of ratification
conforms to the procedures detailed in Article V. See Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAML. REV. 1519, 1528 (1997). "The question, in short, is whether the reception debate will be structured by a formalist understanding that the only constitutional achievements the present generation is bound to notice are those monumentalized through the process
of Article Five." /d. The issue also is whether the amendments or changes are put in a definitive
writing along with the rest of the Constitution. I have given reasons here why written ness is
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But I must say that, for me, these were never the most
persuasive arguments against originalism. I was always moved
more by the "Dead Hand" objection. Why are we bound by the
intentions, expectations, or original meanings of long dead
ancestors-in my case and most others, someone else's ancestors
at that? Then and now, why are those who were excluded from
the ratification process because ofrace, gender, age or the fact
they had yet to be born or immigrate into this country bound
to the commands of the Founders as expressed in the original
Constitution or the commands of those who later amended it? 126
In one sense, the simple answer to these questions is that
we are not. And this is true because the Constitution does not
purport to bind citizens. Instead, with rare exception, it binds
only the government itself. 127 It is easier to see how government
officials, including judges, who take an oath to preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution are consensually bound to its provisions in a way nonconsenting citizens are not-and what would
that oath signify if the Constitution had no meaning independent
of that which these same government officials may give to it
in their unfettered discretion? 128

important, and why the decision by Roosevelt to refrain from seeking a written amendment
doomed the changes he wrought to a less than constitutional status. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra
note 31, at 32Q-32 (discussing proposed amendments to the Constitution and Roosevelt's
decision to reject that means of constitutional change). In Roosevelt's own words: "There are
many types of amendments proposed. Each one is radically different from the other. There is
no substantial group within the Congress or outside it who are agreed on any single amendment."
!d. at 326 (quoting THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLYN D. ROOSEVELT 132
(Samuel Rosenman ed., 1937)). The effort required to settle on a single formulation is one of
the virtues of formality that exists apart from the method of ratifying that formulation.
126. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Meaning of Black's Fidelity to the Constitution, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 1761, 1761 ( 1997) (discussing whether black Americans have any duty of
fidelity to the Constitution).
127. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits private persons, not just government, from enslaving another or holding them in involuntary servitude. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Before its
repeal, the Eighteenth Amendment prohibited private persons from manufacturing, selling, or
transporting intoxicating liquors. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. In my view, the former
prohibition is so overwhelmingly compelled by justice and the need to stamp out completely a
regime of government-imposed oppression that, though it violated the basic structure of the
Constitution which binds government not us, it does not undermine the legitimacy of the enterprise. Too many provisions like the latter, however, puts that enterprise at serious risk.
128. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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Whether or not the Constitution is binding solely on government officials, however, I have tried to explain here why the
relevant issue of constitutional legitimacy depends on whether
the commands, not of the Constitution itself, but of government
officials rendered pursuant to constitutional authority are binding in conscience on us. And the answer to this question will
depend, as I have already argued, on the quality of the lawmaking and enforcement processes that the Constitution establishes-including the adherence by those who speak and act
in its name to a written constitution.
Because the binding nature oflaws made pursuant to constitutional processes governed by the original meaning of the Constitution is not based on popular sovereignty or consent, it is
not undercut, except indirectly, by the fact that women, slaves,
children, resident aliens, convicts, or all of us now living were
excluded from the ratification process. I am bound in conscience
by the laws produced pursuant to the Constitution if there is
reason to be confident that the manner by which these laws
were produced and enforced effectively ensures their necessity
and guards against their injustice-i.e., that there is reason
to believe that such laws are not merely a product of faction
and they do not violate my rights or the rights of others. If the
provisions of the Constitution and the process by which they
are administered and interpr~ted are "good enough" to merit
a benefit of the doubt, we have that assurance and are bound
independently of how this lawmaking process might have come
about. 129 But this also means that, if those processes are good
enough, then they need to be locked iri and protected by an
originalists interpretation of the document that established
them. And this is a version andjustification oforiginalism that
I think even most nonoriginalist ought to accept.
To this consideration, we must add an analysis of how the
Constitution has in fact been interpreted and construed over
the years since its adoption and amendment. Suppose the original

129. Nevertheless, as was mentioned above, the fact that it was designed by some very smart,
sophisticated and generally well-motivated persons and was subject to the ratification of representatives of a large segment of the population provides some reason for confidence-though
not enough to establish its legitimacy standing alone. See supra note 84.
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meaning of these provisions was "good enough" to establish a
lawmaking process that imparts legitimacy upon the commands
issued by government officials acting in its name. This would
still not impart legitimacy on commands that emerge from the
lawmaking process if the procedures and constraints mandated
by the original meaning are not adhered to by these officials,
including judges, or if(to say the same thing differently) these
procedures and constraints have since been changed to something
that is not "good enough" from the standpoint of legitimacy.
If so many deviations have been made from the original meaning
that the lawmaking processes no longer have the same legitimacy-providing integrity, then the binding nature ofits products
may be more dubious.
Some may argue that the original scheme as formally ratified
was not "good enough" to create laws that bind in conscience
or, even if it once was, it would be no longer in today's world.
Only because the system we now have differs in important respects from the original meaning of the written constitution
does it provide that assurance. This appears to be Paul Brest's
position when he rejects moderate originalism on the ground
that it cannot justify those aspects of current constitutional
doctrine of which he and others today approve. 130
Whatever its merits, were this claim to be made explicitly,
it would improve the quality of the discourse concerning the
appropriate method of constitutional interpretation and the
value of originalism. For those who make this claim would have
to admit that they have deviated from the original meaning
of the Constitution as formally ratified and then identify their
criteria oflegitimacy and how the resultant system can produce
laws that are binding in conscience on the individual. Most
importantly for the discussion of originalism, they would have
to explain how the values provided by a written constitution
can be preserved when the writing can be contradicted without
formal amendment by legislatures and judges who object to its
provisions. Morever, those who would deviate from the written

130. See Brest, supra note 3, at 231; see also J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other
Objects ofOur Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1703 ( 1997) (discussing the implications of" constitutional evil" for a duty of fidelity to a constitution).
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constitution in this manner would also have to explain why we
bother to keep it around, except perhaps as a soporific for the
masses.

V. CONCLUSION
Adhering to the original meaning of the written Constitution
as it has been amended in writing is simply one aspect of a
constitutional structure that either is or is not capable of producing and enforcing laws that are binding in conscience on the
citizenry. Putting a constitution in writing is conducive to preserving the rights of the people from infringement by government
officials, but only if its original meaning is not contradicted
or altered without adhering to formal amendment procedures.
A lot also depends on what the writing says. If what it says
describes a structure that is good enough to have this binding
effect, then that is a reason for judges to adhere to original
meaning. If it does not describe such a system then an alternative that does so must be identified and defended. I do not rule
out the possibility of a better system. 131 But all things being
equal, I have explained here why a lawmaking system that allows
interpreters to make unwritten changes to the original meaning
of a written constitution is likely to be less legitimate than and
therefore inferior to one that excludes any such methods of
interpretation.

131. For my suggestions, see

BARNETT, supra

note 84, at 257-97.

